By Subhanil Chowdhury, Newsclick,
March 6, 2012
Over the last 15 years more than 2 lakh
farmers have committed suicide in the country due to debt related problem and
an acute agrarian crisis.
This phenomenon was outside the lived
experience of the people of West Bengal and came only as news from distant
places. But with the Trinamool Congress led government coming to power in West
Bengal, a significant change has happened in West Bengal countryside, where the
phenomenon of farmer suicides have now become a part of rural life in the
state. In the last 8 months 34 farmers have committed suicide in the state due
to debt related problems and non-remunerative prices of the crop. The question
is what explains this sudden acute problem of farmers in the state. In order to
comprehend the problem, it is important to understand the overall national
context of the agrarian situation in the country. Therefore, we start with a
discussion on this aspect before going into the particularities of West
Bengal.
Neo-liberalism and Agrarian Crisis in
India
Agriculture in India has been the worst
sufferer in the aftermath of pursuing neo-liberal policies. With the new policy
regime imposed on the people in 1991, the government reduced its role in the
agriculture sector. This was done in myriad ways. Firstly, the total gross
capital formation in agriculture as a proportion of total gross capital
formation in the country has declined. This ratio was 15.4% in 1980-81, subsequently
declined to 9.9% in 1990-91 and declined to 7.7% in 2009-10. This essentially
shows that there has been a sharp decline in investment in agriculture. This
sharp decline in agricultural investment on the other hand is led by a decline
in public sector investment in agriculture. If we look at public gross capital
formation in agriculture as a proportion of total gross capital formation in
the economy, then it has declined from 17.7% in 1980-81 to 7.1% in 1990-91 and
further declined to 5.9% in 2008-09. This decline in public investment in
agriculture is also manifested from the fact that out of the total plan outlay
only 4.9% was allocated for agriculture and allied sector in the IX Plan, which
declined to 3.9% in the X plan and further reduced to 3.7% in the XI plan.[1] Such an all-round decline in public
investment in agriculture was not matched by commensurate increase in private
investment resulting in an overall decline in agricultural investment in the
country.
With such decline in agricultural
investment, the growth rate of production in agriculture is bound to take a
hit. The following table shows the growth rate of agriculture in the various
plan periods in the country.
Table
1: Growth rate of agriculture in various plan periods
|
Plan Period
|
Growth Rate
|
|
8th Plan (1992-97)
|
4.69
|
|
9th Plan (1997-2002)
|
2.06
|
|
10th Plan (2002-07)
|
2.2
|
|
11th Plan (2007-12)
|
3.0
|
Source: Planning Commission
Note: The growth rate for the 11th Plan
is the expected growth rate
This slowdown in growth rate of
agriculture has resulted in a situation where the share of this sector in the
GDP was only 14.6% in 2009-10.[2] However, this sector employs 67.6% of the
labour force in rural areas and 7.5% in urban areas in 2009-10.[3] This essentially means that even with a
high growth rate of GDP and slowdown in agriculture, the growth process has
failed to absorb labour in the non-agricultural sector. Therefore the agriculture
sector continues to be a repository of low income and poverty.
While there has been a substantial
slowdown in agricultural production in the country, the central government has
liberalized agricultural trade by cutting down tariffs on agricultural
commodities and allowing imports of agricultural products. This has resulted in
a situation in which the farmers of India have been exposed to the price
volatility of the global commodity market. This is more so in the case of cash
crops. In fact, a major proportion of farmers who have committed suicide in
Kerala or Maharashtra are cash crop farmers cultivating vanilla, coffee etc in
the case of Kerala and mostly cotton in the case of Maharashtra. With a drastic
fall in the global prices of these commodities in the beginning of 2000s, the
return on farming for these sections of the farmers collapsed driving many of
them into suicide. If these farmers were not exposed to the global price
movements then a significant number of farmers would not have been pushed
towards suicide.
On the other hand, there has been a
substantial reduction in subsidies provided to the agriculture sector, in
particular the subsidies for fertilizers have been reduced drastically. In
2009-10, Rs 61264.29 crore was provided as fertilizer subsidy. However, in
2011-12, only Rs 49997.67 crore is being provided.[4] Moreover, prices of certain fertilizers
have been decontrolled, which creates another upward pressure on the prices of
this essential agricultural input. Additionally, the government has reduced
agricultural extension services, which again adversely affects the farmers.
All this has resulted in an increase in
cost of cultivation. The real cost of production for rice and wheat are shown
in the following table
Table
2: Growth Rate of Real Cost of Production for Rice and Wheat
|
Year
|
Rice
|
Wheat
|
|
1981-82 to 1992-93
|
-0.13
|
-1.96
|
|
1994-95 to 2006-07
|
1.92
|
1.96
|
Source: Agricultural Price Policy, Farm
Profitability and Food Security: An Analysis of Rice and Wheat, S Mahendra Dev,
_ Chandrasekhara Rao, Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP)
Note: Cost is calculated as Cost of
Production per Quintal of rice/wheat
From the above it is clear that with
the advent of the policies of liberalization, the cost of production for the
two major crops in India has increased. This increase in cost of production is
primarily because of an increase in input prices. According to the reply of the
government to a question posed in Lok Sabha on 23-08-2011,
“The prices of major agricultural
inputs and implements during 2005-06 to 2011-12 (till July, 2011) have
increased by 22.2% for fertilizers, 10.7% for pesticides, 32.0% for diesel,
29.8% for tractors and 32.3% for pumps & assembly in terms of Wholesale
Price Index (WPI). As per the available data, the prices of seeds of various
crops have increased from about 13.5% to 55.5% during 2005-06 to 2010-11.”[5]
This massive increase in the prices of
inputs is a direct result of the policies pursued by the central government
entailing a cut back on crucial subsidies and deregulating prices of inputs
like fertilizers. On the face of such an increase in cost of cultivation, the
only way to keep farming viable is to increase the Minimum Support Price (MSP).
But the MSP is given for a selected number of commodities and not all
commodities. Therefore, such an all-round increase in the input costs of
cultivation is bound to adversely affect the lives and livelihoods of millions
of farmers in the country.
It is in this backdrop that the
agriculture sector in West Bengal is operating. However, it must be noted that
while all the above mentioned factors were operating in India, West Bengal did
not witness any farmer suicide during the period when thousands of farmers have
committed suicide in the country. The crucial issue that needs to be analysed
is what has changed in the last 7-8 months that farmers are suddenly committing
suicide in large numbers in the state. We now turn to discuss the case of West
Bengal in greater details.
Agrarian Situation in West Bengal
Since October 2011, 34 farmers have
committed suicide in the state of West Bengal. Most of these 34 farmers are
poor or marginal peasants and some of them are poor agricultural labourers.
Most of these farmers are paddy and potato farmers who took loans to cultivate
their land. But they did not get any remunerative price for the product which
left them indebted without any prospect of repaying these loans. Driven to
desperation and social embarrassment, they took their own lives.
Although the pattern of the farmer
suicides in West Bengal, in terms of indebtedness and non-remunerative prices
generally follow the pattern of such suicides in other states, there is a
crucial difference. This difference lies in the fact that most of these farmers
are food crop farmers like rice and potato. Being food crop farmers, they are
largely insulated from the volatility of global commodity prices, which spelt
doom for thousands of cotton or coffee growing farmers in the country.
Secondly, for paddy growers, the central government has instituted the MSP,
which theoretically at least is supposed to not only cover the cost of
production but also give some profit margin to the farmers. However, the fact
that the paddy growing farmers are committing suicide in the state points
towards an acute governmental and policy failure. As far as the potato farmers
are concerned, a bumper crop of potato has the potential of crashing the market
price. But government intervention in the past did not allow such a situation
to arise. The fact that potato growing farmers are committing suicide points
again towards governmental and policy failure to deal with the eventuality of
any such crash in prices.
The Issue of MSP
As has been the case in rest of the
country, the cost of cultivation of paddy has increased in West Bengal too. In
the year 2007-08, the total cost of cultivation of paddy per hectare of land
was Rs 28141 which increased to Rs 33046 in 2008-09. The CACP projects that for
the year 2011-12, the cost of cultivation of paddy per hectare has increased to
Rs 38868.[6] Therefore
according to the data of the competent authority itself, the cost of
cultivation of paddy will witness a substantial increase in West Bengal. If we
convert this cost in per quintal terms, then for the year 2011-12, the figure
comes to Rs 896 per quintal of paddy.[7] Given these facts, there are some glaring
problems with the way in which the problem of procurement of rice and paying
MSP has been done in the state.
Let us first look at the issue of MSP.
Last year the MSP announced by the Central Government for a quintal of rice was
Rs 1050. The erstwhile Left Front government announced a bonus of Rs 50 per
quintal so that the farmers received Rs 1100 per quintal of rice. This year the
Central Government has announced an MSP of Rs 1080 per quintal. But the current
TMC-led government has not announced any bonus for the farmers. As a result,
the farmers are getting a price which is lower than last year’s. Therefore,
prima facie, the farmers are worse off than last year in terms of prices, while
their cost of cultivation has increased. This is a perfect recipe for a debt
problem in the agrarian sector of any economy.
The problem however does not end with a
lower effective MSP for the farmers. The farmers will get the MSP only when the
government procures from them. In this regard, the record of the current
government has been abysmal. The state government till 20th January
2011, has procured 2.11 lakh metric tonnes of rice and 57355 tonnes of paddy.
Last year, the total procurement by the state government was 4.55 lakh tonnes of
rice and 11.76 lakh tonnes of paddy, whereby the total procurement from the
state was at 13.10 lakh tonnes of rice.[8] It is obvious that compared to last year,
the procurement drive of the current government has been a total failure. From
certain quarters of the government, it is being propagated that the procurement
has fallen because the Food Corporation of India (FCI) has procured less. This
is nothing but a white lie. In the current year the FCI has procured 71996
metric tonnes of rice, while last year it had procured only 67039 metric tonnes
of rice.[9] Therefore, the
FCI has actually procured more rice this year; it is because of the complete
failure on the part of the government that the procurement has been abysmal
this year.
It is absolutely not the case that the
decline in the procurement of the government is because of a fall in the
production of paddy/rice. Rather, the problem is that this year there is a
bumper harvest of paddy. On the face of such huge production, the necessity of
the government to buy from the farmers becomes even more since in the absence
of governmental intervention, the price of paddy may collapse in the open
market leading to acute distress of the farmers. But, this is where the
government has completely failed by not procuring enough from the farmers. What
has happened is that the government has asked certain rice mills to procure
from the farmers. But these rice mills are dilly-dallying on making payments to
them. In certain cases they have made payments in cheque, which has bounced.
With surplus grain lying in the godown, the farmers have been forced to go for
distress sale, leading to a fall in their prices and hence foreclosing the
possibility of earning any return on the farmers’ investment in the crop. Some
farmers with the possibility of a price crash are unable to sell their crops.
While for others, with the distress sale phenomenon, they are being paid less
than the MSP by the rice mills. In this situation, it is but obvious that the
farmers are unable to meet their debt obligations and other expenses leading to
a desperate step like suicide.
This policy of relying on the rice mills
only to procure from the farmers is in sharp contrast with the procurement
policy of the Left Front government, where the government used to involve all
government and semi-government agencies, rural cooperatives and the Self Help
Groups to procure paddy from the farmers. This had a twin advantage. Firstly,
with such decentralized procurement policy, the farmers did not have to
transport their grains to long distances to sell them to the rice mills.
Secondly, the social intimacy of the Self Help Groups, panchayats with the
farmers in the villages enabled the government to understand the situation
better. This entire approach of decentralized procurement has been done away
with. Moreover, the TMC led government has made the panchayats defunct and are
trying to rely on the bureaucracy for policy implementation in the villages.
This has ensured that elected representatives of the people are bypassed and
the bureaucracy takes over in crucial matters related to the villages, who are
distant from the actual problems on the ground.
The plight of the potato and jute
farmers follows a similar story. The MSP for jute was set at Rs 1675 per
quintal. While the Chief Minister wrote to the central government to increase
this by Rs 400, she took no initiative to ensure that the Jute Corporation of
India sets up procurement centres in the state to buy jute from the farmers.
The central government did not respond to her demand and JCI did not open up
procurement centres, as a result the farmers were forced to sell their crops
under distress and in the process ended up making huge debts from local money
lenders and banks. The plight of the potato farmers followed a similar story.
With bumper harvest of potato and the state government doing nothing to resist
price crash, the price of potato has decreased to 20 paisa per Kg because of
which the farmers are getting zero return on their investment.
Dismal Performance in NREGA
On the face of such problem of farmers
and agricultural labourer in the state, the National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme would have provided some relief to the rural population. However, in
this regard too, the government has been an utter failure. In the current
financial year (2011-12) upto the month of December, 438.41 lakh mandays of
employment have been generated, while Rs 125173.49 lakh being the total
expenditure. During the same period last year (2010-11), 910.71 lakh mandays of
employment was generated with a total expenditure of Rs 153816.63 lakh. On an
average only 14.4 days of employment has been provided in West Bengal till date
this year, while the provision is for 100 days. This is the second lowest in
the country. Only Arunachal Pradesh has generated less number of average days
of employment under NREGA.[10] In other words, compared to the
performance of NREGA under the Left Front government, the TMC-led government
has performed dismally. This has prompted the Minister of Rural Development of
Government of India to write a letter to the West Bengal government pointing
out that the performance of the state has been dismal under NREGA.
Political Economy of the Government’s
Role in the Agrarian Problem
At this point a legitimate question can
be asked as to why the government did not take any initiative to provide relief
to the farmers and has gone on a denial mode saying that there has been no
farmer suicide in West Bengal. In order to understand the problem one needs to
look at the social class basis of the Trinamool Congress. In 2001, when the
Left Front came to power the Trinamool had won 45.7% of the votes of the rich
classes in West Bengal.[11] The very high vote share of the rich for
the TMC at a time when the Left Front was winning elections after elections
shows that the rich always supported the TMC and this is their core mass base.
It is undoubtedly the case that the TMC managed to win a large chunk of the
vote of the poor and lower income category (48%) in 2011 elections when it won
the elections. But it has also increased its vote share to 49% amongst the
rich.[12]
As the interests of the rich and the poor in most of the cases are
contradictory, it is impossible to keep the vote share of both the classes
intact. But, the fact that the rich consolidated their support in favour of the
TMC at a time when the electoral fortunes of TMC were grim shows that for the
TMC, the rich class is a dependent ally. It is for this reason, that while the
TMC supremo indulges in a lot of left rhetoric, when it comes to reality, the
government is failing to take care of the problem of the looming agrarian
crisis.
This alliance between the rich and TMC
is showing its most ugly face in the rural areas. Ever since the election
results have been announced on 13th May, there have been systematic attacks on
the bargadars (share-croppers) and marginal farmers in the state. The land of
the tillers earned through decades of struggle has been re-captured in many
places by the erstwhile landowners. According to a conservative estimate of the
Kishan Sabha, over the last two and half months, land of 527 farmers amounting
to 1000 acres of riot land has been snatched away. Additionally, 4700
patta-owners have been evicted from 2700 acres of land, 3710 bargadars have
been evicted from 1587 acres of land while 14025 persons have been evicted from
legally acquired land. In fact the police resorted to firing when farmers were
resisting forceful eviction from their land at Haroa in North 24 Parganas
district. The fact that the landlord and rich peasant classes in rural West
Bengal could mount an attack on the peasantry to reverse the gains of land
reform after the TMC came to power shows that this class feels that their time
to try and recapture lost ground has come with the coming to power of the TMC
government. In essence then the rural rich feel that the government will
provide protection to them.
The attempt of the government to
paralyze the panchayati raj institutions of the state, which were the prime
democratic institutions in rural West Bengal is yet another example of how the
government is trying to protect the interests of the rich and the powerful.
Through the panchayats, democracy and empowerment was ensured for the rural
masses. But now this institution is under attack. The TMC-led government has
decided that they will bypass these democratic institutions and undertake rural
development by bureaucratic means through the office of the BDO. This is
however only the tip of the iceberg. The real reason lies in the fact that the
Trinamool Congress wants to do away with the functioning of the panchayats in
the state. The Chief Minister had said on record that she wants ‘non-political’
elections to the panchayats, which is essentially a euphemism for robbing the
panchayats of its democratic vitality.
The non-functioning and the denial of
the government of the phenomenon of farmer suicides stems from the fact the
core support base of the TMC has not been affected. It can be however argued
that the TMC came to power after mobilizing people on peasant issues. So it is
wrong to say that its core base is not affected. While it is true that the
issues of Singur and Nandigram did play a part in the defeat of the Left Front,
it is also the case that the TMC-led government till date has not announced a
single policy which will benefit the farmers. The return of land in Singur will
benefit a small number of farmers who will perhaps get back the land after long
legal battles. But the farmers of West Bengal have gained nothing from the
government in terms of any policy announcement in favour of them. Rather, the response
of the government has been a denial of any problem in the agrarian sector. On
the other hand, the CM has been busy with summit with the industrialists,
beautification project of the riverside in Kolkata, beach festival at Digha
etc. But she has not visited a single village where farmers are committing
suicide. This clearly shows that the CM is happy to realize the aspirations of
the middle and rich classes but not the poor.
The total apathy shown by the
government towards the plight of the farmers is only intensifying the crisis.
In this situation, the only way forward is to organize the farmers and fight
for their rights. Such mobilizations are happening on the ground. On 4th
January, West Bengal witnessed a historic strike of the farmers against the
anti-farmer policies of the central and state governments. The entire
countryside came to a standstill with the farmers instead of tilling their
fields organized pickets, processions and protest actions. More such actions
are the call of the day. Instead of committing suicide, the farmers need to
mobilize as a collective against the government. In this struggle, the
solidarity of all of us is extremely important. The farmers should not feel
alone and despondent. The democratic people of the state stand in solidarity
with them in this struggle.
[1]All data in this
paragraph is quoted from Agricultural Statistics at a Glance and Economic
Survey, various issues
[3]“ Employment in
India: What Does the Latest Data Show?”, Subhanil Chowdhury, Economic and
Political Weekly, August 6, 2011
[11] Making and Unmaking
of Trinamul Congress, Dwaipayan Bhattacharyya, Economic and Political Weekly,
April 3-10, 2004
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